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Survey of Ohio Law-1955
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Administrative Authority
It is basic learning that an administrative agency or officer must act
pursuant to the declared policy of the law in specific cases and in accordance
with legally sufficient criteria and standards established by the legislature
to govern administrative discretion. A Supreme Court decision' applied this
fundamental principle in invalidating a municipal ordinance which failed
to provide standards or criteria for the guidance of a zoning board of
appeals.
. This principle was also applied to Ohio Revised Code section 5123.23
by the court of appeals in holding that this section amounted to a delegation of legislative power. 2 The court declared that it gave the arbitrary and
unrestricted power to an administrative officer to consent or not to consent
to the admission of a person over 70 years of age to a mental institution
without any guiding rules or standards, resulting in the delegation of legislative power and denial of equal protection of the law. When the agency
or officer is acting under a law which established sufficient standards or
criteria, wide latitude is accorded to the administrative authority to make
regulations seeking to effectuate legislative policy. Two court of appeals
decisions applied this rule in sustaining administrative rules and orders.
The first case sustained an hours of dosing regulation of the Liquor Control Board.a In the other case Revised Code section 3311.22 and related sections were held to vest a discretion in a county board of education which is
subject only to the limitations of unreasonable action and bad faith. The
consolidation order was upheld as being within the discretion of the Board. 4
Another court of appeals decision involved an interesting question relative to the power of the Board of Liquor Control to hold that the use of a
pinball machine which allowed free games only was the use of a device
which may or can be used for gaming or wagering in violation of Rule 53,
Section II, Liquor Control Board, justifying the revocation of a permit of a
certain class. In holding the license revocation order invalid, the court of
'State v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St 469, 127 N.Y2d 371 (1955). The dissenting
judges agreed on the merits but felt that the writ of mandamus was not the appropri-

ate remedy under the circumstances.
'State v. Baber, 97 Ohio App. 501, 127 N.E.2d 538 (1953).
'Gorman v. Board of Liquor Control, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 510, 126 NXE.2d 34 (Ohio

App. 1953).
'Smith v. Board of Education, 97 Ohio App. 507, 127 N.E.2d 623 (1954).
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appeals pointed out that the Board could not supply any omission in or
improve the provisions of any statute and meet a situation not provided
for by law since administrative rule making cannot be used to supplement
or refine legislative policy.
Construction of Regulations
A court of appeals decision( construed an indefinite and uncertain regulation (No. 14) of the Board of Liquor Control in harmony with the obvious
purpose of the regulations of the board as a whole, applying the well-known
rule of statutory construction that exceptions should receive a strict but
reasonable interpretation. Thus the regulation which permits the transfer
of a permit could not be permitted to enlarge the number of permittees in
an area which by the application of other regulations was a closed or
"frozen" area.

Jurisdiction
7

A Supreme Court decision -reaffirms the primary, original jurisdiction
of the Public Utilities Commission to supervise and regulate public utilities
and railroads and to require the furnishing of services required by law to
the exclusion of any court of law, and also that the Supreme Court has
exclusive revisory jurisdiction of the orders of the Public Utilities Commission.
Administrative law follows a rule of judicial administration in vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the first of two adminisrative bodies having concurrent authority to acquire jurisdiction. This rule was considered in the
decision of the Supreme Court in State v. Shaver wherein a writ of mandamus was granted requiring the defendant Recorder of Hamilton County,
to record the transcript of proceedings with reference to the incorporation
of the Village of Blue Ash. It was held inapplicable because of the exist' Stickley v. Board of Liquor Control, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 516, 126 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio
App. 1954).
'Haynay v. Board of Liquor Control, 57 Ohio Op. 469, 129 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio
App. 1954).
'Northern Ohio Telephone Co. v. Putnam, 164 Ohio St. 238, 130 N.E.2d 91
(1955). Also as an incidental matter raised on an appeal from the Board of Liquor
Control, the court of appeals had occasion to recognize that the Director of Liquor
Control is vested by statute with exclusive authority to grant or refuse the issuance
of permits for the sale of intoxicating liquor and beer. East Toledo Social Club v.
Board of Liquor Control, 130 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio App. 1955).
8 163 Ohio St. 325, 126 N.E.2d 915 (1955).
The court considered that a permanent injunction against the first body acting on the petition for annexation left the
second body, the Board of Trustees of Sycamore Township, free to exercise jurisdiction.
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ence of a court decision to the effect that the first body (Board of County
Commissioners) did not have a valid prior jurisdiction.
Hearing Before the Administrative Agency
1. Agency Power to Disqualfy a Member for Bias or Prejudice
A Supreme Court decision 9 raised an interesting question concerning
the power of the Public Utilities Commission to pass upon qualifications
of one of its members on grounds of bias or prejudice. The court held that
the Commission did not have the implied power to so act. The reasoning
of the court in its opinion suggests that such authority must come from express statutory provisions.
However, the Supreme Court proceeded in the course of exercising the
revisory jurisdiction to examine the charge of prejudice on the merits and
determined that in effect there was no prejudice inasmuch as all three
members agreed on the facts.
2. Objections to Eidence
The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act' 0 permits a reviewing court
to affirm an agency order supported .by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence.
A decision of a court of appeals"' serves to emphasize the importance
of objecting to inadmissible evidence at the time it is offered. In the case
mentioned above an order of the Board of Liquor Control suspended a permit upon the basis of hearsay evidence as to violation, which evidence was
received without objection from the licensee. This evidence was deemed
to be relevant and probative and sufficient to sustain the order. It was held
that the failure to object to the inadmissible evidence constituted a waiver
which prevented the issue of inadmissibility from being presented on
judicial review.
It should be noted that the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, Ohio
Revised Code section 119.09, does not establish a specific -ruleon the admissibility of evidence. It declares that the agency at an adjudicatory hearing shall pass on the admissibility of evidence, and a party may at that time
make objections to these rulings of the agency thereon.
Rules of admissibility must be ascertained from specific statutes applicable to the agency, if any, or from the body of the rules of evidence
applicable to court proceedings which are also deemed applicable to administrative proceedings.
"Ohio Transport, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 164 Ohio St. 98, 128 N.E.2d
22 (1955).
"0OIo Ray. CODE § 119.12.
" Derrick v. Board of Liquor Control, 98 Ohio App. 97, 128 N.E.2d 239 (1954).
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Judicial Review
1. Methods of Review
The original jurisdiction of the court of appeals 12 or the Supreme
Court' 8 may be invoked in appropriate cases through the use of quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, or prohibition. Several cases reported during the year have had a highly restrictive effect on the availability of these
remedies to review administrative action.
Because of their general applicability to so many agencies and officers,
the views of the courts toward the exclusiveness of the judicial review provided by the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act are important. In Green
v. Ohio State Racing Commission,14 a court of appeals decision denied an
original writ of prohibition on the ground that Revised Code section
119.12 provides an adequate remedy at law. It indicated that the writ of
prohibition is to be used with great caution and only where there is no
other regular, ordinary and adequate remedy.
Likewise the writ of mandamus is circumscribed by important restrictions in reviewing administrative action. A Supreme Court opinion15
outlines the burden which a petitioner must sustain to use it successfully.
The relator must show affirmatively: (1) that there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, including equitable remedies;
(2) that there has been a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the
officer or agency and (3) that the relief sought is not merely to determine
a controversy of a strictly private nature. An example of such a successful
application was afforded by a mandamus against the Superintendent of
Insurance.16
Equitable remedies in the civil courts will be unavailable where there is
provided a statutory method of appeal to the courts from the administrative
authority. The Supreme Court held' 7 that an injunctive remedy could not
be used against an order of the county commissioners amending -a zoning
ordinance where there is a statutory right of appeal to the court of common
pleas.
These cases indicate in effect that a statutory method of judicial review,
if considered adequate, is likely to be 'held to be the exclusive method of
review.
OHo CONsT., ART. IV,
OHIo CONST., ART. IV,

§ 6.

§ 2.
Ohio L. Abs. 485, 128 N.E.2d (Ohio App. 1954).
'5 State v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 302, 123 N.E.2d 23 (1954).
"State v. Annat, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 453, 123 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio Com. P1. 1954).
"TEggers v. Mort, 162 Ohio St. 521, 124 N.E.2d 115 (1955), holding that REv.
CODE § 303.12 provides an adequate remedy. The mere inconvenience of having
1470

to resort to the statutory remedy was not considered adequate excuse for going into
equity.
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2. Notice of Appeal
A Supreme Court decision' s held that the notice of appeal as required by
Revised Code section 5717.02 for appeals to the Board of Tax Appeals is
essential to confer jurisdiction on the Board. The time limit for the giving
of notice under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act has been previously
held jurisdictional also.' 9
3. Scope of Review
When a case is submitted solely on the record made in the hearing before the administrative agency, the reviewing court cannot go into matters
happening after the hearing.20
The evidence which the appellant sought to present was the subsequent
bankruptcy of the licensee which vested his rights in the trustee. However, the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act makes it discretionary with
the reviewing court whether a motion for admission of additional evidence
will be granted.2 '
When a matter is left to the reasonable discretion of the Administrative
officer, considerable weight will be given to the administrative determination of the officer. 27
When the basis of review is lack of evidence to support the administrative order, and the appeal comes under section 119.12, Revised Code, the
Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, the reviewing court will affirm the
order if it is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence.23
One decision has held that the order must be sustained even though the
administrative order is unduly harsh and -most severe, 4 indicating that
abuse of discretion is no longer a test on judicial review under the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act. Perhaps the court has overlooked the further statutory requirement that the order be in accordance with law. 5 A
very cogent argument may be made for the proposition that an order
'Lee Jewelry Co. v. Bowers, 162 Ohio St. 567, 124 NX.E.2d 415 (1955).
See Survey of Ohio Law- 1954, 6 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 207 (1955).
mAssad v. State of Ohio, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 185, 127 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1952).
21OnIo Elv. CODE S 119.12.

"Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517, 127 N.E.2d 524 (1955). The lower court
and the dissenting Chief Justice felt that the facts indicated an abuse of discretion and
the violation of constitutional rights.

" Codic v. Board of Liquor Control, 129 N.E.2d 650 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1953);
Ganson v. Board of Liquor Control, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 242, 127 N.E.2d 890 (Franklin
Com. P1. 1953).
"Ganson v. Board of Liquor Control, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 242, 127 N.E.2d 890 (Franklin Com. P1. 1953).
' OMo REV. CODE § 119.12, 2d para. from the end. The existence of evidence to
support a reasonable order does not in itself justify the issuance of an arbitrary one.

